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We meet here tonight because each of us, in his way, is dedicated
to the law. Not law, in general, but law in our own tradition-law
based on the consent of the governed. All of us have a responsibility to
preserve and to strengthen in every way we can that law and that
tradition.
Experience surely teaches us that in carrying out that responsibility
we cannot rest on our oars and rely on momentum to carry us on. The
dynamics of our own society, as well as of the world community,
demand affirmative and constant effort to realize our heritage, and to
preserve it from forces which daily threaten to weaken and to destroy it.
There are many such forces. Some of them are overtly hostile;
and some of them are insidious-like a dry rot which, unseen and un-
recognized, saps at the heartwood. Those which are overtly hostile, let
me put to one side. There are great dangers from outside-enemies
which press upon the United States, and which would destroy our law
and our traditions utterly were they to succeed. Whether we are ade-
quately prepared to deal with our external enemies is a question which
must, of course, concern us all. My excuse for speaking of other things
is that lawyers and those whose interest is close to the law are perhaps
more fitted to discuss the challenges we face at home.
My concern this evening is with the manner in which we exemplify,
in practice, the postulates upon which, as I have already mentioned, our
law is based-that it rests on consent; that the governed are also the
governors. We have embodied this concept in several parts of our
Constitution. This is the premise of democracy. This is a premise, in-
deed, that is not overtly challenged by any of our responsible statesmen.
Yet, I am very much afraid that a sober look at the facts will compel
the admission that it is a premise which has yet to become a full reality.
And because in many areas it has not secured more than lip service we
put strains and pressures on our whole governmental system.
The peculiar importance of the right of suffrage in a democracy
is of course obvious. My concern with the restraints which are imposed
on it is in part a concern that we have not realized one of our funda-
mental goals. But my greater concern is with a more fundamental
danger--a danger related to the rather unique characteristic of "law"
in our country. At the risk of appearing to digress, let me discuss for a
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few moments the nature of "law" as we know it in the United States,
and our relation to it as citizens.
The characteristic of our polity which bears most directly upon
what I shall have to say tonight is the way in which "law", "policy"
and "courts" have become entangled. Far back in our history Alexis de
Tocqueville, that perceptive observer and analyst, remarked, "Scarcely
any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved,
sooner or later, into a judicial question." We continue, perhaps even
increasingly, to regard the contours of the basic political rights of the
citizen as matters for judicial interpretation and their enforcement as
matters for our judges.
This tendency is not without its advantages. It makes civil liberties
subjects of legal right. Yet it has real disadvantages, as well as dangers.
Civil liberties tend to be no greater than the strictly legal rights as a
court may find them. Still more significant is the weakening of the
responsibility of the citizen, as a citizen, of maintaining, as a political
matter, respect in the community for civil rights.
Indeed, the exact reverse tends to occur. The courts, and particu-
larly the Supreme Court, are regarded as alien institutions which are
invading the rights of the communities, and Congress is petitioned to
redress these wrongs. In the long run this pervasive attitude of the
population-from which future judges are drawn-has its effect on
judicial decisions. Mr. Dooley, was, of course, speaking figuratively
when he remarked to Mr. Hennessy that "the Supreme Court follows
the election returns." Mr. Justice Frankfurter states the point more
soberly and precisely in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 556
(1951):
. . . The ultimate reliance for the deepest needs of
civilization must be found outside their vindication in courts
of law; apart from all else, judges, howsoever they may consci-
entiously seek to discipline themselves against it, unconsciously
are too apt to be moved by the deep undercurrents of public
feeling. A persistent, positive translation of the liberating
faith into the feelings and thoughts and actions of men and
women is the real protection against attempts to strait-jacket
the human mind. Such temptations will have their way, if
fear and hatred are not exorcized. The mark of a truly
civilized man is confidence in the strength and security derived
from the inquiring mind. We may be grateful for such
honest comforts as it supports, but we must be unafraid of its
incertitudes. Without open minds there can be no open society.
And if society be not open the spirit of man is mutilated and
becomes enslaved.
Learned Hand, too, has made the same point in one of his classic
statements:
[Liberty] is the product not of institutions, but of a
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temper, of an attitude toward life; of that mood that looks
before and after and pines for what it is not. It is idle to look
to laws or courts, or principalities, or powers to secure it. You
may write into your constitutions not ten, but fifty, amend-
ments, and it shall not help a farthing, for casuistry will
undermine it as casuistry should, if it have no stay but law.
It is secure only in that . . . sense of fair play, of give and
take, of the uncertainty of human hypothesis, of how change-
able and passing are our surest convictions, which has so hard
a chance to survive in any times, perhaps especially in our own.
In short, because in the United States the powers of government
are separated, it does not follow that the protection of civil rights is the
function of the judiciary alone. The other branches of government have
their duties, too-the legislative to provide interpretive and protecting
law; the executive to enforce that law. And, finally, we as citizens,
if we wish to be citizens of a state which preserves individual freedom,
cannot run off after fascist doctrines and leaders, hoping that the courts
will keep us from going too far. So often have we done this that in an
address a few years ago at Washington University the Chief Justice of
the United States speaking of such an incident said, "It is straws in the
wind like this which cause some thoughtful people to ask the question
whether ratification of the Bill of Rights could be obtained today if we
were faced squarely with the issue."
But this does not state our whole duty to our courts. Under our
Constitution we have placed on them a unique and heavy task. Their
duty includes a jurisdiction almost unknown elsewhere, to pass on the
validity of legislative enactments, having as their guide only such general
phrases in the Constitution as "due process of law" and "the equal pro-
tection of the laws." These questions involve "law" and legal consider-
ations which a British judge or lawyer would not recognize as such.
They would regard these questions as involving legislative policy of the
highest order, questions to be resolved at the polls and in Parliament.
Hence, our courts must expect criticism, such as Parliament re-
ceives. Indeed, a democracy must be hospitable to dissent and criticism-
of courts and judges no less than senators and presidents and governors
and mayors. That is a part of the process of government by the consent
of the governed. But our courts are entitled to expect also from the
citizen-and particularly from the Bar-an enlightened understanding
of the duties they are called on to perform and a vigorous attachment
to the liberties incorporated in our Constitution.
What we must seek to avoid is what, for lack of a better word,
I will call subversive criticism. Such attacks do not express dissent;
they seek to destroy the very structure of our law. I can conceive of
no more truly subversive doctrine, for example, than one which would
destroy the power of the Supreme Court to protect a constitutional right
in a case properly brought before it. Yet, serious efforts are being made
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to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases involving particular
kinds of constitutional rights.
Whether we like it or not, we are walking near the edge of the
cliff. The Supreme Court is now caught up in two issues on which it
cannot avoid major political repercussions. The first of these is com-
munism-the domestic variety, in its various direct and indirect mani-
festations. Though this issue is receding from the panic proportions it
reached at the height of the McCarthy era, it is still a matter on which
many people feel strongly. Probably it will remain so for many years,
at least so long as foreign communism continues as a massive external
threat. And, by the same token, the decisions of the Supreme Court
which measure laws dealing with loyalty and security by the standards
of the Bill of Rights will be highly controversial decisions.
For the moment, I see no escape from this, though the prospect is
highly unpleasant. Judges are human and when there is constant and
intense pressure on a constitutional right--such as the right to freedom
of speech-there is very real danger that it will be warped and distorted.
Indeed, I fear in the case of that particular right there has already been
considerable erosion, and that our right to speak and write as we wish
is no longer as free as it was when Jefferson delivered his famous first
inaugural address.
The second major issue which is bedeviling the Supreme Court is
the school segregation controversy. Brown v. Board of Education in
1954 was, in my judgment, no more than the inevitable culmination of
a trend, not only of prior Court decisions, but of the moral feeling of
the American people. Yet, it has added fuel to the fires already burning
brightly in the camps of those who would strip the Court of its powers.
Here, however, there is an alternative. Here there is no need to
put sole reliance upon the traditional method of applying to the courts
for the protection of constitutional rights. In many places the answer
can come from the ballot, once we remove the restrictions on its exercise
which now exist. The road ahead is indeed long and rocky and fraught
with danger if every segregated school in the country must be desegre-
gated by judicial decree. Why not try alternatives?
In a tentative way, we have already recognized that the best and
ultimate solution for a minority as large as the Negro is through the
ballot box, rather than through the courts. But, true to our custom,
we are proceeding in a way which will once again put the courts
squarely in the middle of the fight. If we go on as we are, we must
expect to add a new ground for controversy about the Supreme Court
and its decisions. To the controversy over judicial decisions involving
communism and school segregation we will add, in the near future,
controversy over judicial decisions concerning the right to vote.
Let me review with you for a moment where we are. In the
Civil Rights Act of 1957, after enormous political travail, we have a
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recognition that, when there is an interference by officials of a state with
the right to vote, the Attorney General of the United States may bring
an appropriate legal action-that is, an injunction proceeding in a federal
court-to prevent the interference. How has this worked?
Two things are clear. First, and the one about which I have already
spoken, is that we have put a major part of the burden of resolving this
essentially political problem on the backs of the judges. The political
issue, true to the tradition observed by deTocqueville, has been translated
into a matter for judicial decision. The right to vote is to be secured by
way of the injunctive process. No one can foresee the precise nature
of the cases which will reach the Supreme Court under such a program,
but that they will be fraught with political overtones is obvious. Two
lower courts have already denied the Attorney General the relief he
sought. In one case the issue is whether the Attorney General is power-
less under the statute when the local voting registrars simply resign.
The other is whether the statute is so drafted as to exceed the powers
of Congress. Both cases are headed for the Supreme Court, and under
the present law are no more than the advance guard of a legion of
issues which will impose on the Supreme Court new stresses and strains-
and no doubt new bills to reverse its decisions, or to restrict its jurisdiction.
The second thing that is clear is that the procedure is ineffective.
There is not, to my knowledge, one voter in the entire United States
who has won the right to vote by reason of the Civil Rights Act of
1957, even though that act has been on the books since September of
that year.
Moreover, the device of resignation may well turn out to be an
effective answer to the Attorney General's requests for injunctions.
I doubt seriously that a federal court can require a man to remain in an
office. I also doubt that many registrars would hesitate to give up their
jobs if that would maintain the status quo by barring effective injunctive
relief.
What, then, is the answer, which will reaffirm the right of suffrage
without new demands on our federal courts? Let us examine the con-
stitutional right to vote. Here is one situation where the Constitution is
crystal clear. There is no need-indeed, there is no room-for inter-
pretation, or even for argument. The Fifteenth Amendment of the
Constitution provides:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to en-
force this article by appropriate legislation.
What could be clearer than this? The rule of law is laid down in the
first section. The power of Congress to enforce it by legislation is
unequivocally given in the second.
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The Fifteenth Amendment applies by its terms to any election-
local, state or national. As to the latter the Constitution contains further
voting provisions. Senators and congressmen are to be elected "by the
people" in each state, and the qualifications for voting shall in each state
be those "requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the
State legislature". (Amendment XVII and Article I, Section 2) Presi-
dential electors for each state may be appointed "in such manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct". In fact, the states have directed that
the electors be chosen by the same persons qualified to vote for senators
and congressmen. Finally, the Constitution provides that:
the times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators
and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law
make or alter such regulations. . . . (Article I, Section 4).
But let us put these provisions to one side and return to the simple
mandate of the Fifteenth Amendment-that the right to vote shall not
be denied by any state on account of race or color. Can we seriously
believe, at least since the hearings of the Civil Rights Commission in
Montgomery, Alabama, that the rights of Negro voters are secured in
many of our states? Those hearings made it apparent not only that the
right of Negroes to vote has been abridged, but also that a principal
method of the illegal denial is by the refusal of the state registrars to
follow the provisions of state law and register Negroes to vote.
This does not require the weighing of conflicting evidence. For
example, it is a fact that in two states there are ten counties in which
the majority of persons over twenty-one years of age are Negroes, and,
yet, not one Negro is registered to vote. In the same two states there
are five additional counties in which the Negroes form more than
thirty-five per cent of the total population in which no Negro is
registered. In another state two counties, with a majority of Negro
inhabitants, have none registered, and in eight similar counties the
registered Negroes number less than three per cent. In still another
state there is less than five per cent of Negro registration in seventy-five
per cent of all the counties in the state. Statistics could be multiplied
indefinitely. It is enough to say that in some areas it is open and
notorious that state officials are flouting the Constitution in the prepa-
ration of the registers of voters and in the conduct of elections.
Now, remember that the Fifteenth Amendment declares spe-
cifically that Congress shall have power to enforce it by appropriate
legislation, and ask yourself what legislation would be most appropriate.
Surely not that by which Congress engages in the frustrating and un-
dignified attempt to have the Attorney General and the federal courts
pursue state registrars of voters who resign as fast as they are caught,
and pass the torch of defiance to another runner. The most appropriate
course is the simplest. If some states will not in good faith administer
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their own laws, but insist on making maladministration of them a
method of denying the right to vote, the Congress has a plenitude of
power to legislate that administration shall be taken over and done
honestly by someone else.
The statute need not be complicated. A Federal Board of
Elections could be created and charged with responsibility. Whenever
that Board, after due investigation and hearing, shall find that the list
of eligible voters is not being prepared in good faith in accordance with
state laws, and that by reason of this the right to vote is being denied or
abridged in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, it is authorized
through its own employees to prepare a proper list in accordance with
state law. Thereafter, only that list shall be used and any other list
shall be void. Provision should be made for adding and deleting names
under the supervision of the Board. Finally, if the right to vote con-
tinues to be denied or abridged by the conduct of election officials at
the polls, the Board would be authorized to supersede them with its
own people.
There are, of course, problems of detail. Perhaps the functions
of the Federal Board of Elections could be given instead to an existing
agency, or even to Senator Lyndon Johnson's Community Relations
Service, if that be established. Perhaps the use of the list of voters
should be made mandatory, at the outset, only for the election of federal
officers, in which the nation as a whole has a direct and vital interest.
Perhaps the findings of absence of good faith compliance with state
registration laws should be on a county-by-county basis rather than state-
by-state. And no doubt there should be provision for the return of the
registration function to state officials as soon as a finding can be made
that the state registration laws will thereafter be complied with in good
faith. None of these details would involve a modification of the basic
purpose.
The constitutionality of such a law is unassailable under the grants
of power to Congress which I have mentioned. But, it may be said,
the law could never get by a Senate filibuster. On the contrary, I be-
lieve such a filibuster would not only fail but would be one of the most
educational uses of the Senate's time imaginable.
What could be the arguments brought against the bill? That no
denial or abridgment of the right to vote exists? The facts would be
devastating, and the whole country would know about them as it does
not today.
Could it be said that states' rights would be infringed? But the
laws to be enforced would be state laws. Incidentally, it would be
interesting to see how long the requirement that applicants construe
passages from the Constitution would remain on the books if all appli-
cants had to pass before an informed and impartial registrar. Could it
be said that to supersede state officers by federal officers, as proposed,
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would invade states' rights? This position seems to claim a right in
state officers to discharge their duties fraudulently in order to deny to
a large group of citizens their constitutional rights. This is a novel
doctrine of law and political conduct which might involve its advocate
in some embarrassments during the debate.
Could the broad line be taken that the judgment as to who should
vote is a state matter? Not so far as considerations of race and color
are concerned, since the Constitution specifically forbids them.
What could participants in a filibuster say? They might-as has
been done before-read the Bible. But they would have to be very
careful about the parts they chose. Moreover, plain irrelevant speech to
continue the denial of the basic right to vote would, I venture to say,
become too irksome for many to wish to engage in it.
More than that, can any of us doubt that, if a determined attempt
were made in the legislative and executive branches to move directly
toward removing racial discrimination in registering voters, the very
attempt would produce almost instant improvement? Of course, no one
can be registered who will not make the attempt. But many will. As
they do and are successful, the whole situation would begin to change.
Instead of the courts being called upon to force solidly resisting
municipal agencies to make decisions and take administrative action, an
opportunity would be afforded to affect the will of the municipality at
the source; that is, at the polls where candidates can be forced to state
their positions and stand or fall by them. The judicial task would be
very different when oflicials before the court were willing to obey the
law as declared by the court, than when every artifice conceived by
ingenuity is used to frustrate and delay.
My concern is whether we can afford not to take this approach.
My concern is whether we can afford the luxury of letting the judges
of our courts fight our battles while we cheer and jeer on the sidelines.
We, as citizens, and through our representatives in Congress, must
recognize that what is at stake is the basic integrity of our whole
governmental system. No one of us would willingly default it, but
pride and loyalty are not enough. Last Saturday evening in Charlottes-
ville, Virginia, I heard the Lord Chancellor of England say this:
The defense of liberty must go beyond the trite "eternal
vigilance" and wage an eternal battle. . . . That is the chal-
lenge to democracy-the maintenance of unceasing and active
interest in freedom itself and hence in the machinery by which
it is preserved.
So far in both the United States and in Britain that
challenge has been met. May it always be so.
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